

1a




Figure 1: Payoffs to U.S. are shown first, payoffs to Soviet Union are shown second.

US blockades, SU withdraws missiles.

b. Four US strategies :

- 15 AA: Airstrike at top node, Airstrike at other US node  
 AB: " " " " , Blockade " " " "  
 BA Blockade " " " , Airstrike " " " "  
 BB " " " " , Blockade " " " "

Two Soviet strategies :

- W Withdraw missiles if US blockades  
 K Keep " " " "

		SU	
		W	K
US	A	(-1, -1)	(-1, -1)
	B	(-1, -1)	(-1, -1)
	B	(1, 0)	(0, -2)
	B	(1, 0)	(-2, 1)

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2. Consider  $\pi_2(x, y) = (1-x)(4y - 4xy - y^2)$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial y} = (1-x)(4 - 4x - 2y) = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow x=1 \text{ or } (4 - 4x - 2y = 0 \Rightarrow y = 2 - 2x).$$

We assume  $x \neq 1$  so  $y = 2 - 2x$ . \*

Now consider

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_1(x, 2-2x) &= x(4(2-2x) - 4x(2-2x) - (2-2x)^2) \\ &= x(8 - 8x - 8x + 8x^2 - 4 + 8x - 4x^2) \\ &= 4x^3 - 8x^2 + 4x. \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{So } \frac{d\pi_1}{dx} = 12x^2 - 16x + 4 = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow 3x^2 - 4x + 1 = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow (x-1)(3x-1) = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow x=1 \text{ or } x = \frac{1}{3}$$




We know  $x \neq 1$ , so the government sets  
a tax rate of  $x = \frac{1}{3}$ . \*\*

\* This is a max because for fixed  $x$ ,  $0 \leq x < 1$ ,  $(1-x)(4y - 4xy - y^2)$ , as a function of  $y$ , is a parabola opening downward.

\*\* Graph of the function  $4x^3 - 8x^2 + 4x$  :

Max for  $0 \leq x \leq 1$  occurs at  
 $x = \frac{1}{3}$ .



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3. a. There are no Nash equilibria where the total of the three requests is less than \$6. In this case, none of the daughters is asking for \$4. Then any one of the daughters could increase her request by \$1 and her payoff will go up, while the total remains  $\leq 6$ .
- 10 ✓
- b. Every strategy profile where the total is \$6 is a Nash equilibrium. If any daughter increases her request, the total exceeds \$6 and her payoff drops to nothing. If she lowers her request, then her payoff will drop by that amount.
- 10 ✓
- c. The situations where the requests total more than \$6 but there exists a pairwise sum less than \$6, e.g. \$4, \$3, \$1, are not Nash equilibria because one of the daughters has the opportunity to lower her request (e.g. from \$4 to \$2) to increase her payoff from 0 to a positive number. The situations where every pairwise sum is greater than or equal to \$6, e.g. \$4, \$2, \$4, are Nash equilibria because no matter how much any player drops her request, the total will still be larger than \$6 and her payoff will not improve.
- 10 ✓
- d. "Ask for 1 dollar" does not weakly dominate "ask for 4 dollars." If the other two daughters both ask for \$1, then Daughter 1 gets a payoff of \$1 if she asks for 1 dollar and \$4 if she asks for \$4 (even though asking for 4 dollars is never better off for every other strategy combination for Daughters 2 and 3).
- 10 ✓